BALTIC FREEDOM: TENEBRIS

DATE: 03/09/2026

TIME (GMT): 18:00

ERA: Modern

MAP(S): Maksniemi

TYPE: COOP

TEAMSPEAK: ts1.biaarma.com

GAME: Arma 3

EVENT: Official

AUTHOR(S): Doctor

SLOTS: 63 / 81

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RATING: (33)

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Date: 17 September 2025
Time: 0000 hrs
AO: Estonian Border Region
Force: Special Purpose and Reconnaissance Elements

1. SITUATION

Tensions between the Russian Federation, Estonia and the wider NATO alliance have continued to deteriorate. Russian conventional forces are currently conducting a major military exercise close to the Estonian border which, publicly, remains consistent with previously announced manoeuvres. Estonian and NATO commanders are aware of the concentration of Russian forces but have no confirmed indication that the exercise represents the opening stage of offensive action. That ambiguity is to be preserved for as long as possible.

Russian special-purpose, reconnaissance and electronic-warfare elements have crossed into the border region ahead of follow-on forces. Their task is to prepare the battlespace by disrupting Estonian command and mobility, identifying key defensive positions, preparing selected infrastructure for destruction, degrading aviation and air-defence capability, and gathering an accurate intelligence picture of Estonian readiness. The purpose of the operation is not to begin a conventional engagement, but to ensure that subsequent Russian operations commence against an opponent whose communications, situational awareness and ability to react have already been degraded.

2. ENEMY FORCES

The area remains nominally on a peacetime footing. Russian intelligence expects to encounter personnel belonging to the Estonian Defence Forces, Kaitseliit and civilian policing organisations throughout the AO. There is currently insufficient intelligence to determine whether local Estonian formations have received warning of imminent hostilities. Establishing their actual readiness is therefore a priority intelligence requirement. Commanders are to determine whether observed activity is consistent with routine peacetime conditions, heightened vigilance caused by regional tensions, mobilisation activity or preparations for imminent conflict.

EDF personnel are known to occupy several military facilities within the area. Routine security should be expected around military installations, communications infrastructure, air-defence assets and other sensitive sites. Current intelligence does not indicate that conventional Estonian forces have deployed into a continuous defensive posture, but local commanders retain the ability to secure installations, activate quick-reaction forces, increase patrols, establish checkpoints and coordinate with police or local defence forces if suspicious activity is detected. The principal threat to the operation is therefore not an organised enemy battle group, but the possibility that apparently isolated incidents are recognised as components of a coordinated Russian operation.

Kaitseliit personnel may also be present throughout the wider region. These personnel are likely to operate in smaller and more dispersed groups than regular EDF forces and may possess detailed familiarity with local terrain and infrastructure. Their exact posture is unknown. Civilian policing remains active throughout the AO and, although police units do not represent a major conventional threat, compromise involving civilian authorities could quickly generate reports, roadblocks and wider security activity that restrict Russian freedom of movement.

Russian intelligence has also identified the approximate location of a suspected KAPO safehouse. The facility may contain information concerning Estonian security operations, Russian networks or preparations being undertaken in response to the current crisis. Its precise location remains unconfirmed.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND KEY LOCATIONS

A military airfield within the AO currently hosts NATO combat and support aircraft, including fighter, close-air-support and transport platforms. These aircraft are vulnerable while on the ground and are to be rendered incapable of sortie generation before they can influence subsequent operations. The airfield should be treated as a sensitive military installation with an established security presence. Intelligence further indicates that Estonian engineers have prepared runway-denial charges intended to crater the runway in the event that capture appears imminent. The demolition system is believed to be electronically controlled from within the airfield complex and should be disabled so that the runway remains available for later use.

A small EDF quick-reaction element is assessed to be maintained in the vicinity of the local barracks. Its vehicles are central to its ability to respond rapidly to incidents elsewhere in the AO and are therefore suitable targets for discreet sabotage. The barracks itself is also a priority reconnaissance objective. Close reconnaissance and UAV observation are required to determine whether personnel are maintaining normal peacetime routines or showing signs of increased readiness, mobilisation or preparation for conflict.

ELINT reporting has identified mobile Patriot air-defence activity within the wider AO. Russian intelligence has narrowed the likely operating areas sufficiently to permit reconnaissance, but does not possess the precision required for effective engagement by follow-on fires. Reconnaissance elements are therefore to locate the systems and place targeting beacons as directed. Direct engagement of the air-defence positions should be avoided unless necessary for force protection.

A mobile Estonian electronic-warfare sensor is also operating within the AO. The system poses a direct threat to Russian communications and electronic activity during subsequent operations and is to be located and prepared for destruction. Intelligence assesses that it has a limited local security element. In addition, a more substantial EDF electronic-warfare headquarters has been identified at a former Soviet radar installation near the border. Unlike the mobile sensor, action against this site is likely to involve deliberate clearance and generate a significant operational signature. It should therefore be treated as a late-operation objective wherever the tactical situation allows.

A major communications array has been identified as supporting Estonian military communications. The facility is not to be destroyed immediately. Its power infrastructure is to be prepared for demolition so that disruption can be initiated at the appropriate time rather than prematurely warning Estonian commanders.

Intelligence reporting further indicates that the Estonians have established three fortified anti-armour positions somewhere along the principal route through the area. Their exact locations remain unconfirmed. These positions are to be located and marked for subsequent air attack rather than destroyed during the reconnaissance phase. An intact position whose defenders remain unaware that it has been identified is of greater operational value than one destroyed early enough to warn the wider defence network.

HUMINT also indicates that Estonian engineers have prepared a key railway bridge for demolition. The bridge provides a potentially important route for follow-on Russian forces and is to be captured intact by locating and rendering the demolition charges safe. Separately, ROUTE WHITE has been identified as an important axis for Estonian and NATO movement. Reconnaissance elements are to prepare the route for later interdiction using anti-tank mines and designated marking equipment, while retaining accurate records of all mine emplacement.

4. TERRAIN AND WEATHER

The AO consists predominantly of forested northern terrain broken by settlements, military installations, roads, railway infrastructure and areas of more open ground. Dense vegetation provides good concealment for reconnaissance teams but restricts observation and complicates navigation away from established routes. Roads permit significantly faster movement but increase the probability of detection by civilians, police and military personnel. Military installations generally contain larger areas of exposed ground, with the airfield presenting a particularly difficult environment once teams move beyond the surrounding vegetation.

Road and rail infrastructure is operationally significant and will influence the ability of both sides to manoeuvre once conventional operations commence. Commanders should therefore make maximum use of dead ground, forest belts, dismounted infiltration and UAV reconnaissance while avoiding predictable movement patterns between objectives.

Operations commence during the hours of darkness. Forecast conditions are generally clear, with limited cloud, very light winds and no significant fog or precipitation expected. Visibility through night-vision equipment should therefore be good, and UAV operations are unlikely to be significantly restricted by weather. These same conditions provide little environmental masking, and personnel operating in open terrain should assume that enemy forces equipped with night-vision systems will enjoy similar visibility advantages.

5. FRIENDLY FORCES

Russian forces in the AO comprise a composite special-purpose and reconnaissance grouping under AGAT-10. The command element provides company-level command and control, medical support and fires coordination. MONOLITH forms the principal special-purpose platoon and includes the CYCLONE and DOLOTO detachments, both of which possess reconnaissance, machine-gun, anti-armour, marksman, engineer and medical capability.

EFIR provides the group's intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic-warfare capability, including UAV operation and specialist electronic support. Its role is central to maintaining the common intelligence picture and identifying changes in Estonian posture as the operation develops.

AGAT-11 provides an additional reconnaissance platoon with its own command, engineering, medical and fires-coordination capability, supported by AGAT-111, AGAT-112 and AGAT-113. The force has been deliberately organised to permit multiple objectives to be investigated or prepared simultaneously. Commanders are expected to exploit this structure rather than concentrating the entire force against individual objectives by default.

6. MISSION

Russian special-purpose and reconnaissance forces infiltrate the Estonian border region and conduct reconnaissance, sabotage, target preparation and intelligence collection in order to disrupt Estonian command, mobility, aviation, air-defence capability and situational awareness ahead of follow-on conventional operations. The operation is to achieve the greatest possible shaping effect without prematurely revealing Russian strategic intent.

7. COMMANDER'S INTENT

The purpose of the operation is to prepare the border battlespace so that follow-on forces cross into Estonia against a defence that is partially blinded, disrupted and incorrectly positioned. This will be achieved through dispersed reconnaissance, selective sabotage, preparation of targets for later destruction, exploitation of sensitive sites and accurate reporting of Estonian readiness.

Surprise is to be preserved wherever possible. Intelligence collection should precede the use of force, sabotage should be preferred where it can achieve the required effect without attracting attention, and targets suitable for follow-on fires should be marked rather than attacked directly. Commanders are to avoid destroying assets prematurely where greater operational effect can be achieved by leaving them apparently intact until the appropriate time.

At the conclusion of the operation, Russian command should possess an updated picture of Estonian readiness; a current encrypted Estonian tactical radio should have been recovered; NATO aircraft at the airfield should be incapable of immediate use; runway-denial capability should be disrupted; local QRF mobility should be degraded; key communications infrastructure should be prepared for destruction; identified anti-armour, air-defence and electronic-warfare positions should be located and marked; the railway bridge should be secured against demolition; ROUTE WHITE should be prepared for interdiction; and exploitable intelligence should have been recovered from the suspected KAPO facility.

8. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

There is no requirement for objectives to be conducted sequentially. The force is expected to operate as several independent reconnaissance and special-purpose elements under central coordination. Commanders must continually balance available time, operational signature and desired effect. Concentrating the entire force against individual targets may simplify local command and control, but will reduce the number of objectives that can be addressed simultaneously and increase the likelihood of compromise.

The preferred approach is to allocate detachments or specialist teams against separate objective sets while AGAT-10 and EFIR maintain the wider intelligence picture. Before committing to overt action, elements should establish as much as possible about local Estonian activity, particularly around military facilities and the barracks. Reporting should include unusual troop concentrations, vehicle preparation, increased sentry activity, defensive preparations, roadblocks, changes in communications behaviour or any indication that sensitive assets are being evacuated or protected.

Where practical, tasks are to be completed without alerting personnel at the target. This includes the placement of targeting beacons, sabotage of unattended equipment, preparation of demolition charges, defusal of Estonian demolitions and exploitation of sensitive sites. Direct attacks remain authorised where necessary, but gunfire, explosions, casualties and burning vehicles all create indicators that can be connected by Estonian authorities. Once an objective has been compromised, commanders should assume that the security posture elsewhere in the AO may begin to change.

The assault against the Estonian EW headquarters is the principal exception. This position is expected to require deliberate clearance and is unlikely to be neutralised without significant signature. It should therefore be conducted as late in the operation as practicable. Once committed, the site should be cleared rapidly and decisively in order to avoid an extended engagement.

9. TASKS

Russian intelligence requires the recovery of a current EDF or Kaitseliit tactical radio containing an operational crypto fill for exploitation. A suitable radio is to be captured intact and preserved.

At the military airfield, NATO fighter, close-air-support and transport aircraft are to be sabotaged and rendered incapable of sortie generation. Destruction is not required if the same effect can be achieved more discreetly. The system controlling the runway-denial demolitions is also to be located and disabled so that the runway remains intact.

The EDF quick-reaction vehicles associated with the barracks are to be rendered unusable while avoiding unnecessary compromise. The barracks itself is to be observed using UAVs and close reconnaissance in order to determine the actual readiness of the troops present.

The identified communications array is to be prepared for later destruction by placing charges against its power infrastructure. The facility is not to be destroyed prematurely.

Reconnaissance elements are to locate all three suspected anti-armour positions along the main route and mark them for subsequent attack. Similarly, mobile Patriot systems are to be located and designated for follow-on fires rather than engaged directly unless required by the tactical situation.

The mobile electronic-warfare sensor is to be located and prepared for destruction. The larger EW headquarters at the former Soviet radar facility is to be cleared and neutralised, preferably late in the operation when preservation of operational secrecy is of reduced importance.

The suspected KAPO safehouse is to be located and exploited for documents, communications equipment and other intelligence material. Intelligence recovered from the site may be of greater importance than personnel encountered there.

The railway bridge is to be secured by locating and rendering Estonian demolition charges safe. ROUTE WHITE is to be prepared for future interdiction using anti-tank mines and designated marking equipment.

10. CONTACT AND ESCALATION

This is a reconnaissance and battlefield-preparation mission, not a general clearance operation. Contact with Estonian forces should therefore be assessed primarily in terms of its effect on the wider operation. Where possible, isolated contact should be avoided or broken cleanly rather than escalated into a prolonged firefight.

The destruction of a small patrol may remove an immediate tactical problem but create a larger operational one by alerting local commanders and accelerating the response elsewhere in the AO. Commanders should therefore use force only where it contributes directly to completion of the mission or is necessary for force protection.

If compromise becomes unavoidable, the affected element should complete its local objective quickly where practicable, disengage and report the incident. Other elements should then assume that Estonian readiness may increase and adjust their approach accordingly.

11. SERVICE SUPPORT

Elements should be prepared to operate independently for extended periods. Engineers are particularly important due to the number of tasks involving explosives, sabotage, mine warfare, demolition systems and target marking, and specialist personnel should be preserved accordingly.

Medical support is distributed across the task organisation, but casualty evacuation from a compromised objective may itself reveal the presence and scale of Russian forces. Commanders should therefore minimise avoidable casualties through deliberate reconnaissance and careful planning rather than relying on medical capability to compensate for unnecessary contact.

Ammunition expenditure should remain comparatively low if the operation proceeds as intended. Success is measured by the effects created for the follow-on force, not by the number of enemy personnel engaged.

12. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Overall command rests with AGAT-10. Subordinate commanders are authorised significant freedom of action within their assigned objectives, provided that their actions remain consistent with preservation of operational secrecy and the wider commander's intent.

EFIR is to maintain the reconnaissance and electronic intelligence picture and ensure significant observations are rapidly passed to AGAT-10. Priority reporting includes evidence of Estonian mobilisation, indications that Russian activity has been detected, changes in military security posture, movement of QRF elements, displacement of air-defence systems, unidentified defensive positions, significant communications or EW activity, discovery of exploitable intelligence and loss of surprise at any major objective.

13. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

PIR 1

Do Estonian forces believe a Russian attack is imminent?

PIR 2
Have EDF forces begun mobilisation or dispersal?

PIR 3
What is the actual readiness and response time of the local quick-reaction force?

PIR 4
Where are the prepared anti-armour positions covering the principal axis?

PIR 5
Where are the mobile Patriot systems currently operating?

PIR 6
What intelligence concerning Russian activity is held by KAPO?

PIR 7
What Estonian command, communications and EW systems must be disrupted to maximise confusion during follow-on operations?