Battle of Saint Vith

DATE: 22/12/2024

TIME (GMT): 19:00

ERA: WW2

MAP(S): Darkest December

TYPE: COOP

TEAMSPEAK: ts1.biaarma.com

GAME: Arma 3

EVENT: Official

AUTHOR(S): Aris for Brothers in Arms Community

SLOTS: 73 / 112

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RATING: (7)

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The Battle of St. Vith was an engagement in Belgium fought during the Allied advance from Paris to the Rhine in World War II. It was one of several battles on December 16, 1944 constituting the opening of Germany s Ardennes counteroffensive (more commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge).

The town of St. Vith, a vital road junction, was close to the boundary between the 5th and Sepp Dietrich s Sixth Panzer Army, the two strongest units of the attack. St. Vith was also close to the western end of the Losheim Gap, a critical valley through the densely forested ridges of the Ardennes Forest and the axis of the entire German counteroffensive. Opposing this drive were units of the U.S. VIII Corps. These defenders were led by the U.S. 7th Armored Division and included the 424th Infantry (the remaining regiment of the 106th U.S. Infantry Division), elements of the 9th Armored Division's Combat Command B and the 112th Infantry of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division. These units, which operated under the command of Generals Robert W. Hasbrouck (7th Armored) and Alan W. Jones (106th Infantry), successfully resisted the German attacks, thereby significantly slowing the German advance.

Under orders from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Brigadier General Bruce Cooper Clarke, leader of Combat Command-B 7th Armored Division, gave up St. Vith on 21 December 1944 U.S. troops fell back to positions supported by the 82nd Airborne Division to the west, presenting an imposing obstacle to a successful German advance. By 23 December, as the Germans shattered their flanks, the defenders position became untenable and U.S. troops were ordered to retreat west of the Salm River. As the German plan called for the capture of St. Vith by 18.00 on 17 December, the prolonged action in and around it presented a major blow to their timetable

A little before 05.30 on Saturday, 16 December 1944, a selective artillery bombardment began falling on forward positions of the 106th Division on the Schnee Eifel, moving gradually back to the division headquarters in St. Vith. This attack did not do much damage to troops or fortifications, but did cut up most of the telephone wires the American army used for communications. The Germans also used radio jamming stations that made wireless communications difficult. This had the effect of breaking the defense into isolated positions, and denying corps and army commands information on events at the front line. The most significant aspect of the bombardment is where it did not fall. The villages on the left flank north of the Schnee Eifel were not hit at all. Here Manteuffel had found an undefended gap running between Weckerath to Kobscheid. Into the gaps between the villages marched the 18th Volksgrenadier Division, which bypassed the defended villages and headed for Auw before the general bombardment began. This movement would coincide with a southern advance of the 18th around the right flank of the Schnee Eifel through Bleialaf to Schoenberg to surround American positions on the Schnee Eifel ridge. This double envelopment came as a complete surprise to the American forces as a result of the intelligence failure at First Army level. The high command did not spot the buildup of the German forces for the offensive, and made no preparations to deal with it. This caused a paralyzing lack of situational awareness through the defending forces in front of St. Vith. The American commands in the rear found it difficult to abandon their own planned offensive in view of reacting to an unanticipated German attack. They were slow to react on the first day of LXVI Corps attack, giving the initiative to the attackers and multiplying the damage done.

After the initial artillery strike, searchlights behind the German line lit up, reflecting an eerie illumination from the clouds and lighting up the front lines. Moving forward with the glow, the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division advanced through Elgelscheid toward Winterspelt. This movement, combined with the advance of a southern column of the 18th Volksgrenadiers through Grosslangenfeld to meet the 62nd at Winterspelt and combine for a capture of Steinebruck, with its bridge over the Our River. The capture of Schoenberg, east of St. Vith, also with a bridge over the Our and Steinebruck would set up LXVI Corps for an envelopment of St. Vith itself. The only significant check in the German advance was at Kobscheid, where the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had circled the village with barbed wire and dug in machine guns from their armored cars. Here, they held the village for the day; after dark, they destroyed their vehicles and abandoned their positions, withdrawing to St. Vith. In the other villages, the cavalry troops were forced to withdraw earlier in the day so as to avoid being surrounded and cut off. The Squadron was directed by Colonel Devine to take-up positions on a new defense line along the ridge running from Manderfeld to Andler, on the north side of the Our River.

By the end of the first day, the Volksgrenadiers of LXVI Corps had not made it to St. Vith, or even the critical bridges on the Our River at Schoenberg and Steinebruck. The American village strong points set up by the cavalry groups and sustained artillery fire from both VIII Corps reserve and the units supporting the 106th division had denied LXVI Corps the roads, but the Volksgrenadiers had not been depending on them anyway. Their main problems proved to be the same miserable weather and terrain conditions that prompted the Ardennes counteroffensive in the first place. Colonel Friedrich Kittel of the 62nd Division had set up a bicycle battalion to make a fast run on St. Vith from Eigelscheid, but the snow, ice, and mud had made it ineffective. Expert ski troops could have covered the 11–15 miles of snow covered forested ravines from the Schnee Eifel to St. Vith in one day, but the Volksgrenadiers simply did not have that kind of training or equipment. They did not even have the training it took to take full advantage of the motorized assault guns they did have. This was not enough to pull off a carefully timed series of sequential envelopments and advances through rough terrain.

The 506 Heavy Panzer Battalion was an elite German heavy Panzer unit equipped with Tiger I tanks until 28 July 1944. During the period from 20 August to 12 September 1944, it was re-equipped with a full complement of 45 Tiger II tanks.