BALTIC FREEDOM: TEMPESTAS

DATE: 10/09/2026

TIME (GMT): 18:00

ERA: Modern

MAP(S): Maksniemi

TYPE: COOP

TEAMSPEAK: ts1.biaarma.com

GAME: Arma 3

EVENT: Official

AUTHOR(S): Doctor

SLOTS: 72 / 96

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RATING: (43)

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1. SITUATION

During the night, a series of security incidents, reconnaissance activity and acts of sabotage were reported against military and communications infrastructure throughout the border region. The extent to which these incidents were connected was initially unclear. That question has now been answered. Russian conventional forces have crossed the border in strength and are advancing west from the direction of Narva under the cover of the large-scale exercise conducted immediately prior to the attack.

The situation along the eastern front has developed rapidly. Forward Estonian units have been forced from a number of peacetime locations and there has been insufficient time to establish a conventional defensive line capable of stopping the Russian advance outright. Available engineering effort has instead been concentrated on preparing a series of hasty blocking positions along the principal westbound axis. These positions are intended to delay and disrupt the Russian advance while preserving sufficient Estonian combat power to continue the defence further west.

NATO has begun responding to the attack, but significant allied ground forces are not yet available in the immediate area. Reinforcements are moving toward Estonia from Poland and Germany and other NATO forces are being brought to readiness throughout the region. Their arrival cannot influence the immediate battle. Until then, the task of the forces already in Estonia is to prevent the Russians from converting their initial surprise into an unrestricted operational breakthrough.

D-kompanii will defend the eastern approaches and conduct a deliberate fighting withdrawal along the MSR. The company is not expected to defeat the Russian formation in its initial positions. Its task is to impose delay, inflict disproportionate losses where opportunities permit, force the enemy repeatedly to deploy for combat, and withdraw before becoming decisively engaged. Once the successive delaying positions have been abandoned, the company will move west, reorganise and establish a final defensive position. No further withdrawal is presently planned from that sector.

2. ENEMY FORCES

The enemy is assessed to consist of elements of at least two Russian mechanised brigade-level formations advancing from the east. Allied ISR and communications intelligence have associated the eastern axes with the 583rd Guards Motor Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, although the precise allocation of subordinate units and the location of their main bodies remain uncertain. Reconnaissance elements, infantry and forward mechanised forces have already moved ahead of the principal formations and should be expected to maintain continuous pressure against withdrawing Estonian forces.

The Russian intention is assessed to be the rapid penetration of the border region before NATO can establish an organised defence. Their immediate priority is therefore likely to be momentum rather than the methodical reduction of every Estonian position. Where resistance is encountered, Russian commanders can be expected to use reconnaissance to identify the defensive frontage, employ indirect fire and obscurants to suppress or isolate positions, and then push infantry and mechanised elements forward to force a withdrawal. If the defence remains in place for too long, heavier combat power from the following formations can be expected to arrive and make continued occupation untenable.

SIGINT since the beginning of the conventional attack indicates a high volume of Russian tactical communications consistent with several manoeuvre elements operating simultaneously. Traffic patterns suggest that forward units are maintaining contact with higher headquarters and adjacent formations rather than operating as isolated raiding parties. Estonian intelligence therefore assesses that any Russian force encountered on the MSR can be reinforced rapidly and should not be judged solely on the strength visible at first contact.

Russian indirect-fire capability should be considered significant. Forward forces have access to mortar and artillery support and are expected to use smoke and other obscurants to cover manoeuvre against known or suspected defensive positions. Counter-battery capability available to D-kompanii is extremely limited. Mortar positions must therefore displace when required and avoid becoming predictable through repeated use of the same firing location.

The greatest threat is enemy mechanised combat power. D-kompanii possesses substantial short-range anti-armour capability but lacks comparable armoured protection and should not attempt to trade fire with Russian vehicles in open terrain. Anti-tank weapons should be employed from concealed and mutually supporting positions, preferably against vehicles that have been channelled by terrain or forced to expose weaker aspects while manoeuvring. Javelin systems should be preserved for high-value armoured threats and engagements where their greater stand-off range provides a decisive advantage.

Russian forces are also likely to attempt infiltration away from the MSR in order to identify withdrawal routes, establish observation onto defensive positions or bypass resistance. Forests provide substantial concealment to both sides. Commanders must therefore maintain flank security and should not assume that pressure will remain confined to the road itself.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

D-kompanii forms the principal player manoeuvre force and consists of a company headquarters, two infantry platoons and six infantry squads. Each platoon has three squads and a small headquarters element with dedicated anti-armour capability. The company is reinforced by Viru Jagu, providing additional infantry, anti-armour and short-range air-defence capability, and by an organic mortar section equipped with two 81 mm mortars.

The infantry is well equipped for a light defensive action. Squads possess MG3 general-purpose machine guns and MAAWS anti-armour weapons, while additional Javelin systems are distributed at platoon and attached-element level. Viru Jagu additionally provides a FIM-92 Stinger capability against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. These weapons provide D-kompanii with the ability to inflict significant losses on an advancing mechanised force, but ammunition is finite and must be managed across several defensive engagements rather than expended at the first position.

Company Headquarters includes a Forward Observer to coordinate organic and available supporting fires. The mortar section is the company's principal immediately available indirect-fire capability and should be used to disrupt enemy concentrations, obscure disengagements and suppress infantry attempting to close with defensive positions. Mortar ammunition should be considered a campaign resource for the duration of the action; the section should avoid excessive expenditure against targets that can be dealt with by direct fire.

A-kompanii is operating on a separate axis to the south and should not be assumed to be available as a reserve for D-kompanii. Kalev Infantry Battalion Headquarters and supporting Estonian formations remain further west. Air-defence and engineer elements continue to operate in the rear area while the battalion attempts to establish a coherent defence from units displaced by the opening Russian attack.

D-kompanii has access to a limited number of transport vehicles positioned along the withdrawal route. These will become particularly important once the company clears the prepared eastern defensive belt and must move a considerable distance west to the final defensive sector. They are transport assets rather than fighting vehicles and should be protected accordingly.

4. TERRAIN AND WEATHER

The company axis follows a predominantly east-west MSR through heavily forested terrain. The road provides the fastest route for both the Russian advance and the Estonian withdrawal, but the surrounding forest creates numerous concealed approaches and restricts long-range observation from ground level. Several hasty defensive positions have been constructed along the eastern portion of the route, exploiting bends, narrow approaches, vegetation and areas where attacking forces can be forced to deploy from road march into combat formation.

The prepared defensive belt consists of successive positions rather than a single continuous line. Each position provides an opportunity to force the enemy to deploy, slow his reconnaissance cycle and expose troops or vehicles to anti-armour and indirect fires. The value of these positions is measured in time gained rather than ground retained. Once the enemy has developed sufficient combat power against a position, its continued occupation provides diminishing tactical value while increasing the risk that the defending force becomes fixed or enveloped.

Beyond the final prepared blocking position, the company must conduct a considerably longer withdrawal toward the western defensive area. This movement represents a particularly vulnerable phase of the operation. Commanders will need to establish rear security, ensure casualty evacuation and heavy equipment are accounted for, and prevent individual elements from becoming separated during disengagement.

The western defensive sector has considerably less benefit from the extensive hasty fieldworks available along the initial axis. The company should therefore expect to use the interval before the final engagement to reorganise surviving forces, redistribute ammunition and anti-armour weapons, establish mortar positions, identify engagement areas and improve the defensive position as far as time permits.

Weather at 0900 is forecast to remain favourable, with predominantly clear skies, limited cloud cover, very light winds and no significant precipitation or fog. Visibility will be good. These conditions favour observation and the employment of guided anti-armour weapons but also favour Russian aerial and unmanned reconnaissance. Movement in the open should therefore be minimised and vehicle concentrations should be dispersed where practical.

5. MISSION

D-kompanii conducts a delaying action along the designated MSR in order to slow the Russian advance from the east, preserve Estonian combat power and gain sufficient time for NATO and Estonian forces to establish a coherent defence further west.

The company will hold each designated blocking position until ordered to disengage, conduct a controlled withdrawal to the next position, and continue delaying the Russian advance for as long as practicable. Following completion of the eastern delaying action, D-kompanii will withdraw to the designated western defensive sector, reorganise and hold the position against continued Russian attack.

6. COMMANDER'S INTENT

The purpose of the operation is to deny the Russians the speed they require to exploit the opening phase of the invasion. D-kompanii cannot destroy the Russian formations advancing through the sector and is not required to do so. The company's effect on the wider campaign will instead be achieved by repeatedly forcing Russian units to stop, deploy, conduct reconnaissance, call supporting fires and fight through prepared positions before continuing west.

Commanders are to preserve their force throughout the withdrawal. A position is not to be held simply because it remains physically defensible. Once battalion issues the order to withdraw, the tactical purpose of that position has been achieved and subordinate commanders are to disengage promptly. Conversely, elements are not to abandon positions prematurely simply because enemy pressure is increasing. The success of the operation depends upon maintaining contact for long enough to impose delay while retaining sufficient freedom of manoeuvre to break contact when ordered.

The company's anti-armour capability is central to this intent. Enemy vehicles should be engaged where terrain and preparation allow high-probability attacks from concealed positions. Commanders should avoid exposing anti-tank teams unnecessarily and should plan secondary firing positions before contact. Russian infantry separated from their vehicle support should be engaged aggressively where this can be achieved without compromising the withdrawal.

The desired end state is that the Russian advance through the eastern sector has been materially delayed; D-kompanii has retained a viable body of combat power throughout the successive withdrawals; surviving personnel, heavy weapons and essential equipment have reached the western defensive sector; and the company remains capable of holding that sector while NATO reinforcement and the wider Estonian defence continue to organise.

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The operation will be conducted in two broad stages. During the first stage, D-kompanii will occupy a series of prepared blocking positions along the MSR and conduct a fighting withdrawal from east to west. During the second stage, the company will disengage from the prepared defensive belt, move to the western sector, reorganise and conduct a final defensive battle.

Within the delaying phase, platoons should establish mutually supporting sectors that allow one element to maintain contact while another prepares to move. The company should avoid a simultaneous uncoordinated withdrawal in which all elements abandon contact at once. Where tactical conditions permit, the rearward element should be established before the forward element begins its disengagement. Machine guns and anti-armour teams should cover likely enemy approaches while mortars provide suppression or obscuration to facilitate movement.

Battalion will issue orders to fall back as the wider battle develops. These orders should be acted upon quickly. Platoon and squad commanders must understand their routes to the next position before contact occurs and should identify rally points for personnel separated during disengagement. Casualties and crew-served weapons should be moved before the last covering elements whenever practical.

Commanders should expect the intensity of enemy action to increase throughout the withdrawal. Russian forces will gain information about the composition and methods of D-kompanii after each engagement, while additional combat power will continue moving forward from the east. Positions that achieve surprise during the first engagement should not be assumed to provide the same advantage later in the battle.

The transition from the final eastern blocking position to the western defensive sector is the most significant movement of the operation. The company must use its available transport to move personnel and equipment rapidly while maintaining sufficient rear security to prevent Russian reconnaissance elements from turning the withdrawal into a pursuit. Units are to arrive in the western sector as formed elements where possible rather than as an accumulation of individual survivors.

Once the western sector is reached, the company will immediately reorganise. Platoon strengths are to be reported, casualties consolidated, ammunition redistributed and specialist weapons reassigned if their original crews have suffered losses. Surviving engineers and infantry are to improve positions while the mortar section establishes a defensible firing location. Anti-armour teams should identify likely vehicle approaches and prepare overlapping engagement areas. The remaining preparation time is to be used deliberately; there will be no further opportunity once the Russian main body closes on the position.

8. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS

1. rühm is to occupy and defend its assigned frontage within the company delaying positions, maintain anti-armour coverage of the principal eastern approaches and disengage on company order. The platoon is to preserve its Javelin capability for significant armoured threats and ensure that its three squads remain capable of conducting successive withdrawals rather than becoming individually fixed.

2. rühm is to occupy its assigned frontage, maintain security over the company flank and alternate with 1. rühm as required during successive disengagements. The platoon is to retain sufficient combat power to establish an effective rear guard during the longer withdrawal to the western sector.

Viru Jagu is held under company control for tasks requiring additional anti-armour, marksman or short-range air-defence capability. Its Stinger system is to be preserved for positively identified hostile aircraft or helicopters that present a direct threat to the company or withdrawal route. Viru should not become permanently absorbed into a platoon if doing so prevents the Company Commander from reinforcing threatened sectors.

The mortar section is to provide responsive indirect fire throughout the delaying action. Priority tasks are suppression of enemy infantry concentrations, disruption of forces preparing to assault, and provision of smoke or obscuration during disengagement. The section is to maintain the ability to displace rapidly and must not remain in a firing position once Russian counter-fire becomes likely.

Company Headquarters will maintain the common operational picture, coordinate the timing of disengagements and control the transition to the western defensive position. The Forward Observer is to prioritise targets that materially delay the enemy rather than expend fires against isolated personnel of limited tactical significance.

9. FIRES AND ANTI-ARMOUR PLAN

The primary direct-fire threat to Russian mechanised forces will be the company's distributed MAAWS and Javelin teams. Engagements should be organised in depth wherever terrain permits. Opening fire at the maximum possible distance is not automatically desirable; teams should allow Russian vehicles to enter positions where multiple weapons can engage and where concealment provides a viable withdrawal route after firing.

MAAWS teams are particularly suitable for engagements against lighter armoured vehicles, vehicles forced into close terrain and threats presenting exposed aspects. Javelin should be prioritised against more heavily protected vehicles or vehicles whose destruction will have disproportionate effect, such as those blocking an advance route or coordinating a manoeuvre element.

The mortar section should be integrated into the withdrawal plan rather than treated solely as an attritional weapon. Smoke placed between Russian observation and disengaging troops may achieve greater operational effect than HE fired against dispersed infantry. Mortars may also be used to force enemy infantry to ground while a forward platoon breaks contact.

10. WITHDRAWAL AND REORGANISATION

Withdrawal orders are to be treated as manoeuvre orders rather than indications that a position has been defeated. Platoon commanders are responsible for ensuring that subordinate elements understand which personnel provide covering fire, which elements move first and where the next rally or defensive position is located.

Vehicles should not be brought into exposed forward positions unnecessarily. During the longer move west they should be loaded and dispatched in an organised manner, with priority given to casualties, specialist equipment, crew-served weapons and personnel required to establish the next defence. Commanders must avoid creating a static vehicle concentration that can be engaged by Russian artillery, UAV-directed fires or air attack.

On arrival in the western sector, the company will have only limited time to reconstruct an effective defence. Units should therefore arrive prepared to transition immediately from movement into defensive preparation. Surviving platoons may be reorganised if casualties have made the original structure ineffective. Ammunition, medical supplies and anti-armour rounds should be redistributed according to the positions actually being held rather than retained by depleted elements that no longer require them.

11. SERVICE SUPPORT

D-kompanii has organic medical personnel at company, platoon and squad level. Casualties should be stabilised forward only where the tactical situation permits; evacuation must not compromise the ability of the remaining force to disengage. A medical position is available within the western defensive area for the final phase of the operation.

A limited number of transport trucks are available along the withdrawal route. These are essential to the transition between the eastern delaying positions and the western defensive sector and should not be risked unnecessarily during the initial battle. Loss of transport will significantly reduce the company's ability to move casualties and heavy equipment during the later withdrawal.

Ammunition conservation is important, particularly for machine guns, mortars, MAAWS, Javelin and Stinger systems. Each defensive position is one phase of a larger action. Commanders should avoid exhausting specialist ammunition during an early engagement unless doing so is necessary to prevent the company from becoming decisively engaged.

12. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Overall command of the player force rests with D-kompanii. The company operates under Kalev Infantry Battalion, whose headquarters remains further west and is coordinating the broader defence. A-kompanii is operating on a separate southern axis and should not be considered immediately available for reinforcement.

The Company Commander will issue orders to withdraw from successive positions. If communications are degraded, subordinate commanders should attempt to restore contact before independently abandoning an assigned sector unless remaining in position clearly risks destruction or encirclement.

Priority reports are enemy mechanised strength and direction of movement, identification of tanks or other high-value armoured systems, enemy attempts to bypass the company frontage, Russian indirect-fire locations where identified, significant friendly casualties, loss of anti-armour or mortar capability, and any indication that withdrawal routes have been compromised.

13. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

The most likely Russian course of action is continued aggressive pressure along the MSR using reconnaissance and forward infantry to identify Estonian defensive positions, followed by indirect fire and increasingly heavy manoeuvre elements to force each position. Russian commanders are likely to accept local casualties if doing so maintains the speed of the wider advance. They will attempt to prevent D-kompanii from disengaging cleanly once they recognise that the Estonian defence is conducting a deliberate delay.

The most dangerous enemy course of action is a rapid bypass of the prepared positions using forest tracks or cross-country mechanised movement while frontal elements maintain contact. This could place Russian forces onto the company's withdrawal route and convert an organised delaying action into an encirclement. Flank observation and early reporting of enemy movement away from the MSR are therefore essential.

Intelligence assesses that the Russians retain considerably greater combat power than D-kompanii can defeat locally. The company nevertheless possesses the terrain, prepared positions and anti-armour capability required to impose meaningful delay. Success will depend upon resisting the temptation either to withdraw too readily or to remain committed too long. The company must force the Russians to fight for each stage of their advance while preserving enough combat power to fight again at the next position.

The final defensive sector represents the culmination of the operation. By the time D-kompanii reaches it, casualties, ammunition expenditure and accumulated equipment losses are expected to have reduced the company's effectiveness. Russian forces will likewise have been forced to repeatedly deploy and fight through the delaying positions. D-kompanii's task at that point is to organise what remains into a coherent defence and hold until relief, reinforcement or further orders are received.